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Abstract
Privacy and security have increasingly become
a concern for computing services in recent
years. In this work, we present an efficient
method for Text Classification while preserv-
ing the privacy of the content, using Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). We train a
simple supervised model on unencrypted data
to achieve competitive results with recent ap-
proaches and outline a system for perform-
ing inferences directly on encrypted data with
zero loss to prediction accuracy. This system
is implemented with GPU hardware acceler-
ation to achieve a run time per inference of
less than 0.66 seconds, resulting in more than
12× speedup over its CPU counterpart. Fi-
nally, we show how to train this model from
scratch using fully encrypted data to generate
an encrypted model.
1 Introduction
As Machine Learning (ML) has been widely
adopted in critical electronic systems that may deal
with private data, preserving the privacy of data
has become one of the major issues facing the
technology. This has directed researchers to look
into privacy-preserving techniques to tackle this
problem. One promising technique is the Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), which is a new
class of encryption schemes that allow comput-
ing on encrypted data (Gentry, 2009). FHE has
been shown to be useful in a wide range of privacy-
preserving applications especially in ML (Dowlin
et al., 2016; Badawi et al., 2018; Chou et al., 2018),
statistical analysis (Aslett et al., 2015; jie Lu et al.,
2016), deep learning (Dowlin et al., 2016; Badawi
et al., 2018) and Genome-Wide Association Studies
(GWAS) (Wang et al., 2015; Lu et al., 2015). De-
spite its incredible capabilities, FHE suffers from
two main issues: 1) high computational overhead
and 2) limited arithmetic set (only addition and
multiplication on encrypted data). This means that
one needs to build the desired function as a circuit1
so it can be evaluated with FHE.
In this paper, we choose a shallow neural net-
work (fasttext) (Joulin et al., 2016) for the task of
Text Classification. Using simple techniques, the
model achieves competitive results to those with
more complex architectures. More importantly, this
choice allows us to adapt FHE and perform clas-
sification directly over encrypted text data. Using
GPU, the inference steps can achieve significant
speedup for practical real-time applications. Fi-
nally, we show how an untrusted server can train
this model using encrypted data to generate an en-
crypted model for the data owner.
1.1 Tasks Overview
The system proposed in this paper, which we call
PrivFT2, performs two main tasks as described be-
low:
• Homomorphic inference on encrypted data:
in this task, we focus on how to perform in-
ference on encrypted input texts. We con-
sider a secure Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS) system where an NLP model, previ-
ously trained on non-encrypted data, is stored
in the cloud. The client, or data owner, uses
a homomorphic encryption scheme to trans-
form her plaintext input into encrypted form
(ciphertext) and sends it to the cloud model
for inference. This evaluation generates an
encrypted output that is sent back to the client
who can decrypt and obtain the output in plain-
text form.
1Circuits are built using (mod p) gates, where p ≥ 2 ∈ Z.
In the case where p = 2, these are the normal binary circuits.
When p > 2, circuits are composed of arithmetic gates with
operands and outputs ∈ Zp.
2The source code of PrivFT in Microsoft SEAL will be
made available when the paper is published.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
06
97
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 A
ug
 20
19
• Homomorphic training on encrypted data: in
this task, we focus on how to train a model
from scratch using encrypted dataset. Here,
the data owner sends her encrypted data to
the cloud which performs a batched training
algorithm using back-propagation to learn an
encrypted model (i.e. training operations are
done entirely in ciphertext space). The en-
crypted model is sent back to the client who
can decrypt and use for local inference.
We emphasize that in both tasks no decryption
takes place at the cloud side, which makes our
solution as secure as the encryption scheme itself.
To the best of our knowledge, the homomorphic
encryption scheme used here is still considered
secure when the parameters are set appropriately.
To give a motivational use-case of text infer-
ence on encrypted data, the fully encrypted e-mail
service shown in Figure 1 can be useful. In this
system, Alice composes an e-mail and encrypts it
using Bob’s public key. The encrypted e-mail is
sent to the mail server, which can still run a spam
detection algorithm homomorphically with FHE.
The encrypted result of spam detection and e-mail
are forwarded to Bob, who can decrypt and decide
whether to open the e-mail or discard it. This can
also be applied to other similar use-cases such as
targeted advertising, personalized marketing, rec-
ommendation systems, etc.
Our main contributions can be summarized as
follows:
• We provide the first GPU implementation of
a Residual Number System (RNS) variant of
the Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) levelled
FHE scheme.
• We demonstrate how homomorphic inference
can be performed on encrypted data for text
classification.
• We demonstrate how to train a model using
encrypted dataset with FHE.
• We provide benchmarking experiments to
evaluate the performance of our solution.
1.2 Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 reviews the basic terminology and concepts
the paper builds on. Section 3 describes how
PrivFT performs both inference and training on
encrypted data. Section 4 provides the implemen-
tation details of the CKKS scheme and PrivFT. We
present our experimental results in Section 5. Fi-
nally, Section 6 concludes the work and provides
directions for future work.
2 Background
2.1 Notations
We use capital letters to refer to sets and small
letters for elements of a set. The sets Z,Q,R,
and C denote the integers, rationals, reals and
complex numbers, respectively. We use capital
bold letters for matrices and bold small letters for
vectors. The symbols d·e, b·c, and b·e denote the
round up, round down and round to nearest inte-
ger, respectively. The notation |a|q denotes the
remainder of a divided by q in the balanced set
{⌈− q2⌉ , ..., ⌊ q−12 ⌋}. Finally, sampling a from a
set S is denoted as a←− S.
2.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
FHE schemes are cryptographic constructions that
provide the ability to compute on encrypted data
without decryption (Gentry, 2009). Unlike classic
encryption schemes, FHE maps the input clear text
data (or plaintexts P) to encrypted data (or cipher-
texts C) such that the algebraic structure between
P and C is preserved over addition and multipli-
cation. Let a, b ∈ P and h denotes the encryp-
tion operation, then h(a) ⊕ h(b) = h(a + b) and
h(a) h(b) = h(a · b), where ⊕ and  are homo-
morphic addition and multiplication, respectively,
and where equality is achieved after decryption.
This allows one to evaluate arbitrary computations
(modeled as circuits) on encrypted data by only ma-
nipulating the ciphertexts. Modern FHE schemes
conceal plaintext messages with noise that can be
identified and removed with the secret key (Braker-
ski and Vaikuntanathan, 2011). As we compute on
encrypted data, the noise magnitude increases at
a certain rate (high rate for multiplication and low
rate for addition). As long as the noise is below
a certain threshold, that depends on the encryp-
tion parameters, decryption can filter out the noise
and retrieve the plaintext message successfully. Al-
though FHE schemes include a primitive (known as
bootstrapping) to refresh the noise (Gentry, 2009),
it is extremely computationally intensive. Instead,
one can use a levelled FHE scheme (Brakerski et al.,
2014) that allows evaluating circuits of multiplica-
1) Compose msg
2) Encrypt
3) Send
1) Run spam detection
2) Forward message and 
encrypted result of 
spam detection
1) Decrypt result of 
spam detection
2) If spam ignore msg
else decrypt msg
Figure 1: Fully encrypted e-mail service with enabled spam detection.
tive depth3 below a certain threshold, which can be
controlled by the system parameters. The literature
includes various FHE schemes that vary in the un-
derlying mathematical structures used, capabilities
and performance. This work uses the (CKKS) lev-
elled FHE scheme (Cheon et al., 2017), which was
proposed specifically to deal with floating-point
numbers.
Although FHE is known for being notoriously
slow (Naehrig et al., 2011), a number of major
advancements have improved its performance dra-
matically such as (1) packing methods (Smart and
Vercauteren, 2014), which allow one to pack a vec-
tor of plaintext items in one ciphertext enabling
vectorized homomorphic operations without extra
cost, (2) fast modular arithmetic that replaces slow
multi-precision operations with embarrassingly par-
allel native operations (Bajard et al., 2016; Halevi
et al., 2018; Cheon et al., 2018), and (3) hardware
acceleration via GPUs (Al Badawi et al., 2018; Al
Badawi et al., 2019) which can provide 1 to 2 or-
ders of magnitude against CPU implementations.
2.3 Text Classification
Text Classification is a task in Natural Language
Processing (NLP) with numerous applications such
as Sentiment Analysis, Spam Detection, Topic
Classification and Document Classification. Much
of the recent NLP research has focused on transfer
learning techniques such as pre-training word em-
beddings (Pennington et al., 2014; Mikolov et al.,
2013), or pre-training language models on larger
datasets and fine-tuning them for task-specific
learning (Radford et al., 2017; Peters et al., 2018;
Devlin et al., 2018; Howard and Ruder, 2018).
SentimentUnit (Radford et al., 2017) employs a
single layer multiplicative Long Short Term Mem-
ory (LSTM) while ELMO (Peters et al., 2018)
adopts a base architecture which contains multi-
3The maximum number of multiplications along any path
in the evaluated function. In FHE, multiplication is more
expensive than addition, hence it is crucial to optimize the
number of multiplications.
ple layers of Bidirectional LSTM. BERT (Devlin
et al., 2018) on the other hand uses the Transformer
architecture (Vaswani et al., 2017) which consists
of stacked attention layers. In ULMFit, the AWD-
LSTM (Merity et al., 2017) is used for pre-training
and at fine-tuning time is able to achieve impressive
results across a variety of text classification tasks.
While these approaches achieved remarkable re-
sults across many NLP tasks, they are prohibitively
expensive for FHE adaptation. As mentioned
above, FHE schemes typically introduce a noise
term in the encrypted ciphertext which grows with
every addition or multiplication operation. Depend-
ing on the encryption parameters, the decryption of
such ciphertext only yields the correct result when
this noise term is small enough. As a result, both
the recurrence functions in LSTM as used in Senti-
mentUnit, ELMO, BERT, ULMFit and the stacked
Transformer attentions in BERT result in a level of
multiplicative depth that would corrupt the result
of the computations once decrypted.
Motivated by this limitation, we choose fast-
text (Joulin et al., 2016) for our work as it is
a shallow network consisting of only two lay-
ers: an embedding layer and an output fully con-
nected layer. The input to the model is a vector
x = [x1, x2, . . . , xw] where xi is a positive integer
in {1, . . . ,m}. The embedding layer uses a hidden
lookup matrix H of size m× n where n is the di-
mension of the real vectors. The lookup vectors
are averaged over all w to produce a single vector
h = 1w
∑
iH(xi) ∈ Rn. The output layer uses a
matrix O of size n × c to map the result into the
output space containing c classes. For training, a
softmax function is used to compute the loss func-
tion. At inference time, however, one only needs to
compute the unnormalized scores s = Oh. Thus,
the multiplicative depth in a single inference pass is
only 3 (2 vector-matrix multiplications and average
computation) which is an attractive level for FHE
implementation.
2.4 The CKKS levelled FHE Scheme
In order to describe the CKKS scheme (Cheon
et al., 2017) we need to first introduce some no-
tations. Let R be the cyclotomic polynomial ring
Z[X]/〈XN + 1〉, where N (the ring dimension)
is a power of 2. Let qL > qL−1 > · · · > q1 be
L positive integers such that ql =
∏l
i=1 pi, where
pi’s are 30-bit prime numbers. In CKKS, L is the
maximum multiplicative depth supported, and at
any level l = 1 . . . L, arithmetic operations are per-
formed in Rql = Zql [X]/〈XN + 1〉. Note that a
freshly encrypted ciphertext is at level L and moves
to a lower level as further computation is performed.
Denote DFT and IDFT as the Discrete Fourier
Transform and its inverse, respectively. Given in-
put data represented as real or complex numbers,
we use a modified version of CKKS (Cheon et al.,
2018) for encryption (Enc) and decryption (Dec)
as follows:
• SETUP: given a desired security level4 λ,
and maximum computation levels L, initialize
CKKS by setting N , two uniform random dis-
tributions: Xkey over R2 and XqL over RqL ,
and a zero-centered discrete Gaussian distri-
bution Xerr with standard deviation σ over
RqL .
• KEYGEN: generate: 1) secret key s ←
Xkey ∈ RqL , 2) public key (a, b) ∈ R2qL
where a ← XqL and b = −as + e with
e← Xerr.
• ENCODE(v, ρ): given a vector of complex
numbers v ∈ CN/2 and precision ρ, return a
polynomial µ = bIDFT(2ρv)e ∈ R.
• Enc(µ): given a plaintext message (µ), sam-
ple u ← XqL and e0, e1 ← Xerr. Return
ciphertext ct = (c0, c1) = (av+ µ+ e0, bv+
e1) ∈ R2qL .
• Dec(ct): given a ciphertext ct ∈ R2ql , return
µ = c0 + sc1 ∈ Rql .
• DECODE(µ, ρ): given µ ∈ R and precision
ρ, return v = DFT(µ/2ρ) ∈ CN/2.
To enable computations in the ciphertext space,
the following homomorphic operations are given:
• HADD(ct0, ct1): homomorphic addition
takes two ciphertexts (at the same level l) and
returns ct+ = ct0 + ct1 ∈ R2ql .
4The security level (λ) corresponds to the computational
effort required to break the scheme with probability 1 using
2λ elementary operations.
• HMUL(ct0 = (c00, c01), ct1 = (c10, c11)):
homomorphic multiplication takes two ci-
phertexts (at the same level l) and returns
ct× = (c00c10, c00c11+c01c10, c01c11) ∈ R3ql .
Note that a procedure known as relineariza-
tion (Cheon et al., 2017) can be used to reduce
ct× back to two elements ∈ R2ql .
• HADDPLAIN(ct, pt): homomorphic addition
of a ciphertext ct = (c0, c1) ∈ R2ql and
plaintext pt ∈ R returns ciphertext ct+ =
(c0 + pt, c1) ∈ R2ql .
• HMULPLAIN(ct, pt): homomorphic multi-
plication of a ciphertext ct = (c0, c1) ∈ R2ql
and plaintext pt ∈ R returns ciphertext ct× =
(c0 · pt, c1 · pt) ∈ R2ql .
CKKS mimics fixed-point arithmetic for approx-
imate computing on encrypted numbers. Input
real numbers are scaled with a fixed-precision fac-
tor and rounded to the nearest integer (quantiza-
tion). For instance, the value 3.14159 can be rep-
resented as 3142 with a scale factor of 1/1000. To
maintain a fixed precision of the intermediate val-
ues, CKKS offers an efficient rescaling procedure
(RESCALE) to remove the least significant bits of
intermediate results. For instance, after multiplying
two messages m1 and m2 each scaled with factor
ρ, RESCALE produces a rounded version of the
product ρ · b1/ρ ·m1m2e instead of ρ2 ·m1m2:
• RESCALE(ct, l′): given ciphertext at level l
and l′ = l−1, return ct′ = bql′/ql ·cte ∈ Rql′ .
As mentioned in section 2.2, one can drastically
improve FHE performance via packing methods.
In CKKS, a vector of up to N/2 complex numbers
can be encoded in a single plaintext element. This
allows one to perform Single-Instruction Multiple-
Data (SIMD) homomorphic operations on packed
ciphertexts for free. Packing can be viewed as if the
ciphertext has independent slots, each concealing
one data item. To facilitate later discussion on
packed ciphertexts arithmetic, we will need the
following utility function:
• ROTATE(ct, r): the packing slots inside a
ciphertext can be rotated by computing ct′ =
(c0(X
r), c1(X
r)).5
5The rotated ciphertext ct′ can only be decrypted using
s′ = s(Xr). To make ct′ decryptable under the original
secret key s, a procedure known as key switching (Cheon
et al., 2017) can be used.
The reader is referred to the referenced papers
for proofs on the correctness and security of the
scheme.
3 PrivFT
In this section, we discuss the two main tasks in
PrivFT: inference and training with FHE.
3.1 Inference with FHE
To adapt the initial lookup and average-pooling
layers in fasttext with FHE, we first require the
client to encode her text (x) into a one-hot vector
(v) of length m, where vi = 1 ⇐⇒ x contains
word i. Thus, these two layers can be substituted
by a vector-matrix multiplication (vTH) followed
by a scalar division (for average). This alleviates
the server from the need to perform expensive ho-
momorphic dictionary look-up operation. Since
m is usually large, we pack the hidden matrix H
vertically to improve performance. Specifically,
the server encodes the weights matrices of the hid-
den and output layers as shown in Figure 2. To
encode H, we use n × dm/te plaintexts, where t
is the number of slots in plaintext/ciphertext6. For
the output matrix O, we assume that the number
of classes c is less than t and pack the weights
horizontally requiring only n plaintexts. If c > t,
multiple plaintexts can be used.
To compute (vTH), the dot-product is computed
via element-wise ciphertext-plaintext multiplica-
tion (h′j = HMULPLAIN(vi,Ptxtj,i)), followed by
dmt e HADD(h′j ,h′j+1) to generate a single cipher-
text ct. The elements in the slots of ct can be
summed to generate hj using the TotalSum proce-
dure (Halevi and Shoup, 2014) in O(logN) time
complexity, as shown in Algorithm 1. A similar
approach is used to multiply with the output matrix
O. The class scores ciphertext is communicated
back to the client who can decrypt and find the best
class. Note that we suffer zero loss to inference
accuracy with this setup.
3.2 Training with FHE
In order to train the network with FHE, a number
of challenges have to be addressed. First, the max-
imum multiplicative depth of the training circuit
should be minimized in order to avoid bootstrap-
ping. We use gradient descent with large mini-
batch size to reduce the number of weight updates.
6The maximum number of slots in plaintext/ciphertext is
N/2, where N is the ring dimension.
Algorithm 1 TotalSum
Input: ciphertext ct encrypting vector v and
number of slots t
Output: a ciphertext encrypting the total sum
of elements in v, duplicated in slots
1: for i = 1 to log2N do
2: t = ROTATE(ct, 2i))
3: ct = HADD(ct, t)
4: end for
5: return ct
Moreover, we use a small number of epochs to train
the model. The second challenge is how to evaluate
the loss function with FHE. In fasttext the authors
use Softmax as a loss function. Since FHE pro-
vides only addition and multiplication, evaluating
Softmax as a circuit can be very expensive. In-
stead, we use a shallow approximation polynomial
that can be evaluated cheaply with FHE. We use
the polynomial (18X
2 + 12X +
1
4) which showed
no noticeable loss in accuracy.
4 Implementation
4.1 GPU Implementation of CKKS
We implement the RNS variant (Cheon et al., 2018)
of the CKKS levelled FHE scheme (Cheon and
Kim, 2018) using CUDA 10. The usage of RNS
allows implementing the scheme using native 32-
and 64-bit operations with high parallelism instead
of slow, serial multi-precision operations. Core
polynomial arithmetic, RNS and Discrete Galois
Transform (DGT) tools were obtained from the
A∗HE GPU library (Al Badawi et al., 2018; Al
Badawi et al., 2019) for high parallelism and im-
proved performance. Below is a brief description
of our implementation of the new tools required by
CKKS.
We instantiate CKKS again on the cyclotomic
polynomial ring R and use ciphertext moduli qL >
qL−1 > · · · > q1. At any level l, arithmetic is
performed in Rql = Zql [X]/〈XN + 1〉 modulo
both ql and 〈XN+1〉. Note that a freshly encrypted
ciphertext is at level L. As we compute further on
the ciphertext, we switch down to a lower modulus
via the RESCALE operation.
Our implementation of the CKKS utilizes the
core polynomial arithmetic provided by A∗HE
which implements the Fan-Vercauteren (FV) FHE
scheme (Fan and Vercauteren, 2012). The major
changes, however, are the encoding, decoding and
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𝒗
Figure 2: PrivFT prediction task. Ptxt and Ctxt refer to plaintext and ciphertext, respectively. t denotes the number
of slots in plaintext or ciphertext. Shaded boxes are ciphertexts while clear ones are plaintexts.
rescaling procedures. Since ENCODE and DE-
CODE are not on the critical path of homomorphic
computation (they are invoked by the client before
providing inputs and after receiving results to/from
the cloud), we implement them in CPU. On the
other hand, RESCALE, which is performed by the
cloud during homomorphic computation, is critical
to the performance. Implementing RESCALE in
RNS is both complex and expensive as it requires
comparison, which is hardly compatible with RNS.
Instead, we implement it by computing the floor
function using RNS division by a subset of the RNS
moduli (Omondi and Premkumar, 2007; Fan and
Vercauteren, 2012) as described in Equation (1).
The error generated from this approximation is
added to the inherent noise included in FHE and
found to be negligible by experimental results. Our
implementation of RESCALE can be used to di-
vide by the last prime modulus in the prime chain
pl. The prime chain is ordered such that pi < pi−1
to provide a simpler and more efficient scaling pro-
cedure, as shown in Algorithm 2. Note that our
ordered prime chain alleviates the need for expen-
sive RNS base extension (Omondi and Premkumar,
2007).⌊
q′l
ql
· c
⌋
=
⌊
1
pl
· c
⌋
=
(c− |c|pl)
pl
(mod q′l) (1)
5 Performance Evaluation
5.1 Datasets
We evaluate our method on various datasets cover-
ing three common text classification tasks: senti-
ment analysis, spam detection and topic classifica-
tion. These datasets are the IMDB Movie Reviews,
Yelp Reviews Binary Dataset, AG News Corpus,
Algorithm 2 RNS RESCALE by a single RNS
modulus.
Let B denote the underlying RNS base of ql = {p1, · · · , pl}.
Input: ct = (c0, c1) ∈ R2ql in RNS representation and l
′ = l− 1
Output: ct′ = (c′0, c
′
1) = bq′l/ql · cte
1: for i = 1 to 2 do . For each polynomial in ct
2: for j = 1 to N do . For each coefficient
3: for k = 1 to l′ do
4: c′i[j] = (ci[j]pk − ci[j]pl )× p
−1
l (mod pk) . Since pl
is less than pk , ci[j]pl is used without RNS base extension.
5: end for
6: end for
7: end for
8: return ct′
DBPedia Ontology Dataset. In the results listed in
table 1, we include both bi-gram and tri-gram terms
to the input and use m = 500, 000 to limit the vo-
cabulary size, and set n = 50. Training (to generate
the models for PrivFT inference) was done using
stochastic gradient descent (i.e. minibatch size =
1). Note that in contrast to ULMFit (Howard and
Ruder, 2018) which pre-trains a language model on
the large out-of-domain dataset (Wikitext-103), we
only use the training dataset given in each task. On
the other, gradient descent with large mini-batch
size is used in PrivFT training.
Model Datasets
Yelp AG IMDB DBPedia
ULMFit 97.84 94.99 95.40 99.20
PrivFT 96.06 92.54 91.49 98.80
Table 1: Accuracy (%) of our unencrypted fast-
text model against the current state of the art
(ULMFit (Howard and Ruder, 2018)). The generated
models are used in the PrivFT inference task.
5.2 CKKS Parameter Selection
The levelled CKKS includes a number of parame-
ters that must be set appropriately to ensure both
correctness and sufficient security level. First, the
standard deviation of the discrete Gaussian distribu-
tion σ is set to 3.2 following the recommendations
of the FHE standard (Albrecht et al., 2018).
There are three problem-dependent parameters:
L, ρ and qL. In PrivFT, the inference task requires
L = 5 to cater for three subsequent multiplica-
tions and vector rotations in the dot products. The
training task, on the other hand, requires larger
depth L = 46 levels to cater for the feed forward
phase and computing the loss function all multi-
plied by the number of epochs (2 in our case). The
CKKS computation precision ρ has a limited range
practically (220, · · · , 260) and can be chosen ex-
perimentally. Finally, the size of qL in bits can be
estimated heuristically as |qL| = L × ρ bits. The
final parameter that needs to be set is the ring di-
mension N which affects both performance and
security level λ. N , which is a power of 2 number,
has a very limited range {210, · · · , 217} in practi-
cal implementations. For each N , one can use the
LWE estimator (Albrecht et al., 2015) to estimate
the security level achieved. According to NIST rec-
ommendations (Barker et al., 2012), the minimum
security level recommended for today’s computing
capacity is 80-bit.
5.3 CKKS Micro-Benchmarks and
Comparison
In this section, we compare the performance of
our GPU implementation of CKKS with Microsoft
SEAL (SEAL) version 3.2, which implements an
RNS variant of the CKKS scheme as well. We
show the performance of basic CKKS primitives
for various parameter settings. Experiments were
performed on a server with an Intel Xeon Platinum
8170 CPU @ 2.10 GHz with 26 cores, and 188 GB
RAM. For the GPU-accelerated implementation,
we used 1 TESLA V100 (@ 1.380 GHz with 5,120
cores) and 3 P100 (each @ 1.189 GHz with 3,584
cores) NVIDIA cards each with 16 GB RAM.
Table 2 shows the latency of a number of CKKS
arithmetic primitives in both SEAL and our GPU-
accelerated implementation. It can be clearly
seen that GPU-CKKS outperforms SEAL-CKKS
in all primitives with various parameter settings.
Speedup factors ranging from 1 to 2 orders of
magnitude have been obtained. Of particular in-
terest is the primitive HMULPLAIN that is heav-
ily used in the inference task to multiply the en-
crypted inputs with plaintext weights. In partic-
ular, HMULPLAIN showed 33.78× to 244.62×
improvement over SEAL.
5.4 PrivFT Micro-Benchmarks
5.4.1 PrivFT Inference task
We implemented the inference task of PrivFT
in both SEAL-CKKS and our GPU-accelerated
CKKS. The CKKS parameters used in this exper-
iment are: (N, log2 qL, ρ) = (8192, 200, 40), pro-
viding sufficient security level λ > 80 bit. Table 3
shows the latency (in seconds) of evaluating the
inference task for one example from each dataset
in both SEAL and our GPU implementation (here
we also include the Youtube Spam Collection and
Enron Email Dataset for benchmarking purposes).
It can be clearly seen that the GPU implementa-
tion provides a quite reasonable run time (< 0.66
seconds) for practical applications. In conformity
with the results from the preceding section, GPU
provides more than 12× speedup compared to the
CPU solution. We emphasize that for this task, the
prediction accuracy of PrivFT on encrypted data is
the same as fasttext accuracy on unencrypted data,
which is shown in Table 1.
Message Size The client is required to communi-
cate to the server dmt e ciphertexts, i.e. d5000004096 e =
123 ciphertexts. The ciphertext size in bits can
be estimated as 2 ∗ N ∗ log2 qL. Therefore, the
total message size from the client to the server is
384.375 MB. After homomorphic inference, the
server sends back to the client c ciphertexts.
5.4.2 PrivFT Training task
The training task is much more computationally
intensive compared to the inference task. To at-
tain sufficient multiplicative depth and security
level, we had to set the CKKS parameters to
(N, log2 qL, ρ) = (65536, 2300, 50). The learn-
ing rate and batch size were set to 45 and 1007500
tokens, respectively. This large batch size limits the
number of model aggregates resulting in a training
circuit with a shallow multiplicative depth. Under
these parameters, we could not perform homomor-
phic training on GPU since the system memory
(GPU and CPU) was not sufficient (PrivFT train-
ing task requires more than 200 GB RAM). How-
ever, we managed to run the training task for the
YouTube Spam Collection dataset with Microsoft
Function (log2 n, log2 q) GPU-CKKS SEAL-CKKS Speedup
HADD
(13, 200) 0.023 0.586 25.48×
(14, 360) 0.025 1.291 51.64×
(15, 600) 0.047 5.976 127.15×
(16, 1770) 0.156 32.992 211.49×
(16, 2300) 0.188 37.155 197.63×
HADDPLAIN
(13, 200) 0.033 0.393 11.91×
(14, 360) 0.038 0.831 21.87×
(15, 600) 0.054 3.084 57.11×
(16, 1770) 0.184 28.476 154.76×
(16, 2300) 0.299 32.801 109.70×
HMUL+RELINREAIZE
(13, 200) 0.403 10.831 26.88×
(14, 360) 0.742 23.073 31.10×
(15, 600) 2.338 107.083 45.80×
(16, 1770) 33.577 1619.15 48.22×
(16, 2300) 55.884 2519.847 45.09×
HMULPLAIN
(13, 200) 0.018 0.608 33.78×
(14, 360) 0.019 1.268 66.74×
(15, 600) 0.035 4.1 117.14×
(16, 1770) 0.136 26.928 198.00×
(16, 2300) 0.17 41.586 244.62×
RESCALE
(13, 200) 0.118 5.601 47.47×
(14, 360) 0.14 11.845 84.61×
(15, 600) 0.274 41.29 150.69×
(16, 1770) 1.283 257.464 200.67×
(16, 2300) 1.632 319.188 195.58×
Table 2: Latency in (milliseconds) of core CKKS homomorphic operations in Microsoft SEAL and our GPU-
accelerated implementation.
Implementation Datasets
Youtube Enron Yelp AG IMDB DBPedia
CPU SEAL 3.836 7.949 7.876 7.877 7.897 7.740
GPU CKKS 0.230 0.630 0.652 0.656 0.649 0.632
Speedup 16.69× 12.62× 12.08× 12.00× 12.17× 12.25×
Table 3: Latency (in seconds) of evaluating PrivFT inference task with Microsoft SEAL 3.2 and our GPU-
accelerated implementation for different datasets.
SEAL on another system. Training took 266.4
hours (or 11.1 days) on a server equipped with In-
tel Xeon CPU E5-2630 @ 2.20 GHz with 482 GB
RAM. The accuracy of the generated model was
the same as that generated by fasttext using gradi-
ent descent with large mini-batch, that is 86.3%.
Message Size The client needs to encrypt each
record in the dataset using dmt e ciphertexts. The
ciphertext size in this task is 287.5 MB, i.e., total
message size will be r · 287.5 MB, where r is the
number of records in the training dataset. After
training is done, the server sends back to the client
n(dmt e+ c) ciphertexts.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed PrivFT: private and fast
text classification solution on encrypted data us-
ing FHE. The main task of PrivFT was to perform
inference on encrypted data using a pre-learned
plaintext model. PrivFT can be used to implement
several text classification applications such as senti-
ment analysis, spam detection, topic classification
and document classification without compromising
the privacy of the input data. We provided an effi-
cient GPU implementation of a new FHE scheme
(known as CKKS) and compared its performance
with an existing CPU implementation and showed
that 1 to 2 orders of magnitude speedup can be
achieved. We implemented PrivFT in both CPU
and GPU libraries and showed that PrivFT requires
less than 0.66 seconds (on GPU) per inference on
various datasets. We also showed how training a
model on encrypted data can be done in PrivFT. As
future work, we will try to improve the run time
of PrivFT training task by fitting it to GPUs. We
expect this to provide about 45× speedup in light
of the benchmarks in Table 2. This requires an effi-
cient design to decompose the problem into smaller
parts and ensure that GPUs are fully utilized.
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